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Game‐theoretic models are developed to study systematically the selfinonitoring
and self‐reporting systems that industrial and Other enteprises are often required to
implement to demonstrate their cOmpliance to envirOnmental regulations TwO
enforcement systems are modeled and analyzed in detail using extensive form games
The first systena implements self‐re orti g,by requiring the operator of the firm or
facHity to repOrt information on its Own discharges tO he enforcement agency ln the
second systena, the only enforcement measure is sampling of the discharge and
auditing of the records by the enfOrcement agency COmparison Of Nash equilibria for
a range of values of model parameters indicates wllen self‐report g systems can be
effective,and suggests when a self‐reporting requirement is a preferable feature of an
enforcement system
Key wOrds : Eれforcement, EnvirOnmental regulations, Inducing cOmphance, Non‐
cooperative game theory
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1, Introduction
As awareness of the environmental crisis grows world―wide,st cter environmental laws,resulations,and stan―
dards have been introduced in many jurisdictions, Stricter environmental regulations,howeveri d0 1lot atw,ys mean
that every resulated individua1 0r nrm is more likely to comply. Enforcement of resulations,by means of ttaonitoring,
auditing,and penaLzing,is an essential component of the task of agenties responsible Sor ensuring coinpliance Un―
Fortunately,environmentat agencies with very lhnited resources are cottmonly required to monitor discharges fl・orn
scores or even hundreds of FacHities,tO assess apparent violations,and to carry out enForcement actions as appropri―
ate MoreOver,relatively small penalttts are the norm for ttost convictiolls,so the deterrence of violations by the
threat OF heavy nnes is rarely practical. The success of environmental regulations tllereFore dcPends crucialy on the
levels Of eaciency and ettectiveness that the enforcement agency can achieve,despite lindted penalties and budgetary
constraints that may be severe
The prOblems of enforchig environmental regulations have been studied Froin the ttiewPoint of rnicro―econonlics
(Downing alld Watson,1974i HarFord,1978i ViscuS and Zeckhauser,1979;Linder and McB?de,1984;Har?ngton,
1988)and game theory(Avenllaus,1990;Russell,1990i KIIsour et cr,1992)Essentially,these works analyze tile
enfOrcement ProЫem of a resulatory agency tt a problem of adiusting the level or amount of dttcllarge to the sodally
optinュal level,by means oF enforcement actions that depend on the threat Of detectiOn and pllnishment of violations
EnSorccmellt problenis ilave alsO IDeen analyzed using the thcOry Of rcPcated nOncooperative ganics,in order to design
(VOlllntary)enfOrcement systens that cattt証乾e on cOOperatおn by he regtllatory agency and the regulated agents
(ShO鯰,1984晰Scho鯰,1984bi hkuyama cι αど,1994)
Recently, 1■ order tO reduce costs, some enforcement agencies Iュave shift d com,liance verincation activities
to the Operators being resulatedi Specincany, 。perators are required to monitor their own discharges and report
the■l to the agency. For example,in Canada the Ontario Ministry of EnvirOnment and Energy us9s sel年monitoring
systellls extensively in comPhance assessment for more than 160 industrial direct dischargers, Dischargers inonitor
their emucnts on an agreed―upo basis, and report the data to the Ministry at resular intervals. As enforcement
agency, the ?linistry tilen carries out audit procedures sttch as spl't―sample comparisons to ensure the reliability of
the scIとnlOnitOred data,as、ven aもverincation sampling to detect under―re, rting.
Yet it is questionable lvhether auditing htt a signincant deterrent erect on careless sclf―monitoring or data
ralsincation via Hllder―reporting Because the sel工reporting systen1 8iVes thc operator some discretion in the data it
rePOrtS,it alay nlotivate the operator to report only the most favorable data rrhus,selttreporting is efFective only if
it is inlplemented in an incentiv∈comPat bl  systeHl,in which an operator ahvays makes reasonable clforts to conaPly
by dischar8ing、vithin reskllations,to monitOr accurately its discharge level,and to report the data it observes without
ilodincation,
Some research htt been carried out on the efrectiveness of sel「repOrting systems in environmental regulations
froni a naicroccononlic viewvPoint,「Fh s、vork focuses mainly on conditions that penalty levels balance the enforcement
costs ofthe regulatory agency Ьr exampに,K plow and Shavdl(1994)and Malik(1993)show that an enforcttnent
systein with a rdaively hea?er pena ty agttnst false reporttng and a rdattvdy nghter penalty against(truthrully
reported)?OlatiOn reduces the regulatory agencyЪ mOnitOl・ing io d,resulting in lower enforcement costs,Harrord
(1987)analyZes the beha?Or or a resuにted operator as a funcSOn oftlvcj penaldes,ag?st violations of the resulatiOns
and against False reporting  The iinportancc oF the tracloOFr between truthful reporting and compliance efrort is
Pointed Out, In this research,the behaviOr Of the regulated operatOr is assumed to be Optilnal under tile enforceincnt
scheine,including penalties and n10nitorin8 P。liCy, that is exogeneously deternlined by the regulatory agency. TIle
behaviOr of the t■gency and the counter―actio s of the Operator are therefore nOt considered in these modcls
The relationshiPs bet、veen the enforcement agency and tlle regulated ol)eratOr can be described t■s interactions:
actiOns alld cottnter―a tions FOr example,、vhen the operator voluntarly compliesヽvith the resu ation,the agency may
ttse lenient enfOrcement.(〕n th  other lland,、vhen the operator makes only a、ve  efrOrt to conlPly,the agency inay
use stricter enfOrcement such as more frecluent rnonitoring and more severe penalties, Such strategic behavior by two
interacting deddOn makers can be efrecively anttyzed onty by gaine th∞ry By employing game theor nc techniques,
key factOrs in enfOrcement relationshiPs between resulatOr and resulatec,such as the incentives and disincentives tO
truthftti reporting,can be mOdeled exPIcitly
Thc object?e of this research tt to develop Formal game theoretic modeにf r t■ssessing he ere Sven ss of
selirePorthlg systenls  The 8anae inodcis t0 1)e introduced here extend the basic naOdel oF en「orceinent with selト
reporting g?eiェin Fukuyama cι α′(1994)Two enfOrceinent systems,with and witllOut sel←reporti,18,are rePresented
abstractly as extensive form galnes The NtASh equnibritR or tliese gaines deternine the conditiOns tulder el11lich the
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enfOrcement with sel←reporting systems,
??
enfOrcement cail be erlcient and efFective FurthermOre,the equihbria of the two mOdels can be compared to clarify
tllc ettect Of introducing sel「reporting intO enforcement
2, Ganie Models of Ellvironniental Enforcenient
2‐l The Ganie
Iェュgeneral】the use of sel年monitOring and sel卜reporting systems in the enforcement oF environmental standards
can be described as Folows. The OperatOr monitors its discharges and subHェits the data to the resulatory agency on a
regular basis. TO sttpport this rePOrted data,the environmental agency carrics out auditing activities,such as spht―
SainPle conlParisOns,as wen tas ver1lcatiOn samphng,including unannounced on―site visits,to veriFy the sel←eport d
data. If there is evidence oF a violation,the insPecting agency can issuc a control order,begin legal action in a court,
or levy a penalty directly.
Figure l shOws an extensive game lllodel of a systen■For enforcing a regulatiOn that incOrporates scI←reporting
There are two decisiOn makers,caned operator and Agency, OPcrator represcnts an industrial lrni prodttchis lvater―
or air―borne discharses,and Agellcy is an environmental agency l■charge oF regu tin  Operator's disdlarge, Agency
ttses a sel工reporting systena requiring that()perator rnonitorits disdharge and report the data tO Agency To interpret
Figure l,start Ft・oni the toP and read dOwnttard Eadi box containing a caPital letter represents a decision Point rbr
the decisiOn maker designated by tilat letter.Hellce,at the start of the same,OperatOr tOl muSt aecide wiietller
to 1/2οrcιθ or oottt″どy. 1lere, レ々ο!αιe does nOt necessarly mean intentional viOlatiOn,but rather niinim・al comphance
eFFOrt,whicll may result in viOlationS Of en?ro mentユst ndards.Likewise,θοP22,ry means maximal compliance
erFort IF OperatOr cllooses Comply,the game mOves to the 10wer right subtr99,but if Operator chooses Viblate,it
passes to the lo、ver left  After this decision, Operator sel■rnOnitOrs i s dischaFge leVels, producing a report that is
either(COmpliance'or`Violation' The nieasurement of dischatge level is represented by open―citcle nodes in Figttre
l  These nOdes cOrresPond tO randOin eventsi the nieasurenient of direct discharge is ainlost alwaさ,s arfected b)・
uncoェitrollable Fact。どs such as dilutio二1, as wel as operational, machine,and nleasurement errors  Bccause oF these
exogeneous factors,the resultiilg cOmpliance status renects not only OperatOr's preYiOus CornPliance erFort level, but
also diance(or ?sk).TIle exogen∞us I・isk Of a Faulty mcasurement is represented by the condiSonal probabihhes
of sel卜niOnitOrhig errOrs,εc and ευ For exanlPle,the probability that an Observation rttuits in`ComolianCe'fOr an
OperatOr whO chOse Comply is l―εc
As shown in Figure li OPcrator's second decisiOn is whether tO report the true nionitoring results to Agency
(兄CPο″サ7}ιん)Or to fahify the da,a(F七′θ▼υ)The nrst ophon,Report Tl・uth,dOes not mean that OPcrator reports its
Conlphance erfOrt level,but only its measurement ln particular,it niay happen that the data reported by Operator
under the RcPort Trttth alternative dOes llOt agree wvith results Obtained froln independent veriFlcatiOn  NOte that
if OperatOrるselimOnito?ng result is(Comphance,'it h益■。 incent? tO fahtti therefOre the Faldfy optionおnot
shOwn
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Table l:Benent/Cost Parameters
υ″9,?ιO,｀ /1ye,cy
cO i Cost of Compliallce Effort
Pυ : Penalty ror Violation
″′  I  Penaltv ror False ReDOrt
ca : Auditillg COst
cJ  !  Environmental Damage caused by Violation
b : Reductibll in DamaFre rOr Detected Violation
At Operatorるsecond level or decision nodes,its alternat?e choice,Falsify,means intentional良胡sincah。1l a d/or
fabrication of data, and may also include ilnProperly gathered data, By applying proper nionitoring Procedures
in a cardess or negittent manner,or by udng improper pЮcedu es,Operator may obtain data(withOut exPlidt
亀ldicatbn)that are ttr dittrent hom what shouH have becn obt?ned lf OperatOr deddes to VbLte i?缶証ly
(SO that the game is in tlle lower lefthand subtrec)and then`Nature'produces a measurement or`Violahont'then
Operator must decide wilether to RcPort Tl・uth(leftmost branch of the tree)or Fal前,,Note that,because OPcrator
diose Violate iュitialy, the Report Truth option in this subtree imphes the ad■liss on tha  the original dioice ～vas
Violate. Thus,if Operator chooses the leFtmost path, Agency does not need to monitor,for it knows that Operator
is in violatiOn
On the otiler lland,Agcncy,represented by tAl,in Figure l has Only one decision,to ve?fj・the sel←rcPo ted
data(1/CT4/y),or not(ACCC″ι)The Ve?ncason PrOcess h tassumed tO bc Perrect in the sense that it enabにs Agency
to deter,ュine for certain,wilether OPerator Observed `COmphance'Or tヽ/iolationデand thereFore whether Operator's
second decisiOn was Report Truth or Falsifュ HoweVer,the verincation process is imperttct in another sensc,it is
hnl)ossibic rOr ABcncy tO deternline precisely Operator's lcvcl of coinphance erort,I.e, its original(lecisiOn toヽ「ioltRte
or ConiPIy
十  NOte that the four decidon points for Agency h the lower part of Figure l are enclosed by a dotted hne to
indicate that they lie in the sanle information set, Conseqttently,Agency does not kno、v the prior even s in the sallle
wllen it makes its chOice ln Other wOrds,Agency must decide whetller to Verify or Accept without any iェlForniation
about Operatoris decision to Violate or ComPly lf OperatOr originally chose Violate,and if the monitoring resuit
,was`ViolahOn,i and r Operator then dedded to Report Tl・uth(腱孔nOde),then Agency can infer everything that
lhappened Previottsly,includhig all of()perator's decisiOns
The ganie llas ten possible Outcomes represented by the solid circies in Figure l, For example, if OperatOr
cl100ses Violate ntst,tllen moliitOring Produces`Violationギlle  Operator c looses Falsify,and inally Agency chooses
h/e?fy,tllen tile same results in detected ?ola ion Th  expected utihty pttor oF eacll outcome for Operator and
Agency is indicated in Figure l adiaCent to each terElinal nodei the nrst entry in parentheses is the payofr ror Operator,
and the second for Agency, The cost and beneFlt Factors included in these payors are measured tas von Neumann
and Arrorgenstern utilities and are cOnstructed fronl the parameters given in Table l Note that al symbols represent
positive numbers,so a payorf Parameter with a nesative sign rcPresents a cost The case in、vhich Operator chooses
Violate,thea monitoring produces`Comphanceギthen Operator chOOses Report Truth,and inaly Agency chooses
Accept,偽assumed tO be the base case with PayoT(0,0)INote that in thtt casc cOmphance is readied witllout
any erort by Operator and Agency]FOr exan∬鈴∬Operator diooses VbLttt resdthg h`Vblatお■,'then c ooses
hi前け,前ld Agency chooses VerifJ7,then Operator's Payo何is―Pυ一PんWhere the penalty ttr ?olahon is″υ and the
penalty for faるincahon is P/t Agency re∝?es―cα一ど+b,renechllg tile damage caused by the violation(一ど),die
verincason monitoring costs(―ca),and the benent oF dettchng ?olation(b)
In this Sel工RcPortil18 Gamei the P'aJers'Stratesic chOices are represented b)′decision 、,ariablesi c is the l)rOb―
abilit3′that Operator cliooses ComlぅJl sc(1-C)iS tlle probabint),。f violatei,ヽc s tile plobabilitさ,tllat Operator
choOses Report TI・uth、・hen it has aready diOsen ComPけ】and(1-″む)that it Chooses hにi争i″υ tt t c ProbabintⅢ′
that 01)eratOr chooses Report Trtlth、ャhen it had already chosellヽlolate,(1-,｀ど)t e l)robabilit),tllat it cllooscs
Falsiち′ and lPl is tile probability tllat Agency chOOses Veri,,sO tllat(ユー,1)iS the probabiliぃ′ti】at Agencさ'chooses
Accept  lf a decisiOn variable is neither l nOr O】then it s interpreted as thc PrObabnit)′that the dec sion maker
chooses accordingly For exanaple,if O<c<1,then c is the probablity that Operator chooses Conlply,so that l―c
is the prObability oF Violate
The exPected PayoFr For OperatOr,じO,can be exPresSed as
[ち =Ct一 Co+εc「
｀
ε{,,,(Cr tt P/)一Cr)一
"ユ
(Cr+ヵ )〕l
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+(1-C)(1-ευ){ttat(″υ+″′)ッυl Tv―・P(pυ+Pr)}・
Sinlilarly, the exPectCd PayOff fOr Agency is                                                 '
y独 =_a cattC'εct,t((Ca+与)Tc―CPユー CPTc―
'I十(1-C)(1-ευ)「,と((Ca一b)″υ tt b}十b・ ,・υ―tJ〕。           (2)
The Players,Operator and Agencyt choOse thdr deciSon vttiaЫes,c,Tc】and″υ(for Operator)and Ptt(for Agency)
to maxinlize their expected PayoFrs, In the analysis,Nぉ1l Equilibriun■is the pri lary soluti。■cOncept
2-2 Equilibriuni Analyses
A Naksh equihbrium,(ptti C・,Tど,'・t),おa combinahon of complete strategies,for Operator and for Agency,such
that each player`stratesy is a best resPonSe to the other.TVe condder only cases,■whicll ca―(1-ευ)b<0,So that
Agency has an incelltive to audit
A Nash equihbriurn is obtained by cOnsiderins the stable combination of the bedι TcPry θ。″esPο,2J9,109,fOr the
dI Players,The best reply corresPondenceるa∞mpたte mψPhg oFthe ttrategy set ofthe oPPo■ent(S)On ns/her own
strategy set,which brings abOut the best exPected Payofr.First,when c。+εcPυ>(1-ευ)pυ,it Can be shown that the
Only pOssible best reply cOrresPondence for OperatOr is Violation,1.e. c=0. Accordingly,our equilibriunl analyses
will cOncentrate on the case when c。+εcPυ<(1-ευ)Pυ ThiS COnditiOn implies that(1-Cc―ευ)>rO/Pυ(>0).(FOr
the detailed de?vatiOn and calculatton of Nash equilb?um the sel年reporhng game,reFer to Appendix(Aど1)).
The eqttilJ)ria oF the sel「reporting gaine model have two possible forms, depending on the relative values or
some cost and benent parameters The cOmplete list of POssible equlibria is siven in Table 2 Note that the game
has a uniquc Nぉh eqdiLb?um h each ctte.
Table 2: Nash Equlibria of Enforcenent Game with Sel「Rたp ting
…1l When cα_(1-ευ <O and ca―εcb>0
輛
`cr+ε
"-1lb
0
1‐2ぃVhen Ca―(1-ευ)b<O and曳一εcb<0
エ 1
Cicarly,I】O equlib?u n hdudes truthttd repor?ng TIュe equihb?uln in casc tl■〕hiVOiVes(soine)COnaphance by
OperatO」(o<Ci<1).Case tl刻haS,as its unique equJibrium】FttH compl ance eFFort,c章=1.Tllis case is realzed
when the ra面o OF audtting cost(ca)tO benent oF detectiOn(b)偽おSS thala the probabihty of Obs釘? g ViolatiOn,
whether that ObservahOn ttlbws bw compliance efFOrt(1-ευ),Or hをh COmphance ett εc〉
3. Bnforcement withOut SelttReporting
Figttre 2 shows an extensive fOrln game oF envi」onmental eniOrcem t without sel←reporting. Th  modei can
be Obtained fl・oni the gaine of Figure l by simply remo?ng Operatorるel工reporting decision points(虎cPο,'ど 7}ばんOr
免 んfrty)・The exPccted payorrs oF Operator and Agency are givenぉr。11。ws.
げο = c・I―的+εct,,2(″υ+P/)一Pυ}″ε一t・2(pυ+ヵ)ll
キ(1-C)(1-Cυ)t{P・2(pυ+Pr)一Pυ}Ъ一 m(Pυ+″ノ月
L/4=―,,L cα+C ect,,ユ{(Ca―b)Tc tt b)+bl・c―』
+(1-C)(1-ευ)t,t{(Ca一b)″υ tt b}+b rυ―Jl           (4)
This ganae ll縣 cight POssible Outcomes,denOted by soLd circles in Figure 2 ,Vhen,Agency has some incentive to
MOnitOr(Pυ<r。/(1-ευ一εc))and Operator has soneincentive tO COmply((1-ευ)>C。/b),it Can be sIュOwn that the
modcl withOut sel卜rePorting or Figure 2 always has a unique Nash equinbrium(refer tO Appendix(A-2)for details),
h10ne Ofthe twO fOrms shown in Table 3
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Figtire 2: Extensive Form sallle oF environmental enforcement without sel←reP rti g.
Whcll case ap∬おs dCPends on the cost/benent pttameters.hr exampl劣? Ca.se p_1l the eXpected benents
fronl resulation exceed the auditing costs. Tlle results are interpreted below,
4. Results and Conclusion
The denning condhiOns for Case tl■lin Table 2 and Casc t2-ll in Table 2 are identicali they placc exactly the
same condtbns on the cost/benent parameters,SimihHy,Case tl一切 h TaЫe 2 and Case p_劉h TaЫe 2 are the
same,We win rerer to cttes μ■l alld t2-ll as the hish audit cost cases,and Cascs μ-21 and t2‐21 as he 10W audit
cost cases By conlParing the two high audit cost cases,and the two 10w audit cost cases,we can assess the e∬ects of
seI―reporting systems on enforcement.
In the high audit cost ctte, the expected benent fronl regulation, whether compliance efrort is high or iow, is
腱ss than the audinng COSts for the enforcement agenc}Whether thereおsd卜reportt g(s∝CaSe tl…21 or Table 2)or
nOt(Case p_劉。fTaЫe3),the Operator's com∬五n∝eFFOrtにvd h idenhcal,and equ』sc・=岳瑞 髪 常・HOWeVer,臆ss
mollitOrhg in required with selireporthg.Note tIIat the mollitoring probability,れH h tl■1 0f Table 2 is less than the
monito?ns prObabihty,れい n Ctte t2■1 0f Table 3.h other words,with sel=repo■ting,a lower level f monito?ng
eFFort is required to achieve the same level of compliance eFFort by the operator.
In the 10w audit cost case, the expected benent From resttlati。■ always xceeds the auditi■g costs  Under
enForcement withOut sel「repor tng(see case 12-1l of TalDle 3),tlle agency inductt fltn cOmpliance eFrort Fl・om the
operator(cホ=1),but。二1ly by the maximum monttoring(ttt浄=1)If Sel「r porting is included h the enforcement
system(see Case tl-l10f Table 2),fI1l COmphance c*=1偽sust?ned by the less―than―certain monitoring level
t7t率=テ★身<1・ln other wOrds,the sel=reporhng system reduces the monitoring level required to mottvate the
operator to comply ftlny,resul?ng in a reducSon in enforcement∞sts Moreover,it tt clear flom Case tl‐2〕 that
an increase in the penalty against False reporting, ″r, can reduce the level of mOnitoring required to acllieve full
conaphance.
Fina‖y,it is obviotis that the shift frOlla the high attdit cost casc to the low atldit cost case can be brought abOut
by reducing thc cOst of rnonitoring and auditing cα. The efrect is mportant,as the resulting Nasli equnibriuni moves
fl・Om probabilshc comphance to certain(fl111)compliance ThereFore,the innovations in mOnito?ng te hnology are tol
be welconied They can be a key factor in reducing costs and increasing eFFectiveness in environrnental enforcement
Table 3:Nash Equilibria of Enforcement Game without SelttRePorting
[2‐1l Wllen ca―(1-ευ)b<O and cα一εcb>0
[2‐2〕When Ca―(1-ευ)b<O and cα一εむb<0
VERIFY  ACCEPT
([m〕   [1-m]ラ
1
田
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In this Paperi the efFectiveness or sel卜repOrting is analyzed by constructing, analyzing, and comparing two
extensive galale models of enforcement These naodels are identical,except that one includes sel←rePort ng and the
other dOes nt This methodology has clarifled the conditions under which self―rcPor ing systems can b  successft l in
ilnprOving the erectiveness,and reducing the costs,of en「Orcing e vironmental resulations.
Appendix: Equilibriini Calculations
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?Olate l.e c>0).Simttarly,the valuc Of rυ at cts Operator`exPected ptayoT only when c<l Also,because
O≦c≦1,the stratesy that brings about the naxinauni expected payo「For OperatOr ttways appears either at c=0
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Consequently
>           >
げ。rc= accordins as,■=
<          <
AIso,WVlleli c=0,
Conseclucntly
1/9rυ=(1-ευ){?,と(pυ+pノ)一Pυ〕
>
υοrt= accOrding as,2
<
Let r/。be exぅressed with thc dedsbn va?abtts exlDlたitly as C/9(c,Tc,Tυ,7tt)When c=1,
υο(1,1,一i,■)= ―co tt εcPυ  l
ι
`ο
(1,0,一;PT2)= 一 Co一 εc(Pυ tt Pァ),,ユ
IVhen c=0,
ι19(0:―,1;,,2)=―(1-ευ),υ
ころ(0,一,0:,,1)=―(1-εv)(Pυ+Pァ),,i
Here,ir,■>Pυ/(Pυ+Pァ),tllen tile trutll―reporting is alw鉛ぉ better orr,or υ。(1,1,一i pP)>ι
`ο
(1,0,一i172)and
ち (0,一,1,,・)>%(0,一,Oi,1)Here the difrerence oFthe ma?mum exPec ed PaヵFrs when complying and ?olaSng
is sivelェby t/。(1,1,一;,1)一[ち(9,一,li,,2)=一CO―εcPυ+(1-ευ)pυ EIse iF,E<.Pυ/(pυ+Pr),theli falsincation is
alw,ys better,Or yο(1,0,一;,,ι)>LIo(1,1,一; ,t)t■lld r/。(o,_,Oi',ュ)>1/9(0,一,1;?η)Here tlle diFrerence is given by
t/9(1,0,一
i,と )一
yο
(0,一 ,Oi?れ )=一
cO+(″
υ +ρ
ァ )阿 (1-ε υ
一 ε
c)
Then,it tt verined that the F01lowing gives the best reply corresPondences for OperatOr,(cうCじ
',,,を
cJι
,riCJι)(,,,)
l1/11en co tt ε  Pυ>(l一ευ)ρυ
碑,中阿=(朧件|‖沖挫封協朔 (12)
196       Kei Fukuyama・D Marc Kilgour・Keith W.Hipel:Effectiveness Of Self‐Reporting ystems
in Enforcement of Environmental RegulatiOns
When c。+εc″υ<(1-ευ)Pυ
rη,<…
if η=輛
if F手諭雨万<・L<ガ栃 (13)
if阿=ガ窃iFれ<,,,<1
(2)The BeSt RcPly CorresPondenc∝OF Agency
Fl・Om(4),
吻,0=緒 =緒 =修
・
岬 一け 十刺 -0-効檀 1-司+曳ЪttC―μα ● ―→ 叡 1-→+蝸刃 0つ
Because L/4_(c)iS Iinear in c and O≦C≦1,the sig  Of t/A“(c)Can be assessed by studyingげス,(0)aI】dιアス,(1)
NOw,
〔ちれ(0)= ―Cαキ(1-ευ)ib(1-″υ)+9c,｀υ〕
十(1-ευ)t―(Ca)/(1-ευ)十b―(b―Ca)?'υ!
プスn(1)=(εcb―Ca)+εc(Cc―b)Tc
because l―ευ>O COnsequently,
(15)
(16)
銑 盟Q)硬O accordng as Tυ砂―Cα)冨b~1-ευ         (17)
First suppose b≦cα、B cause cc<cα/(1-ευ),it Fol10ws that O≧b一cc>b―ca/(1-ευ〉Tllerefore,｀ror any
″υ satisFying O≦″υ 1,0≧ Tυ(b一 ca)≧b一 cα >b一 ra/(1-ευ)so that t/4加(0)<O by(17).Next,suppose ca<b<ca/(1-ευ)・ Then,fOr any″υ,Tυ(b―Cc)≧0>b―Cc/(1-εv).By(17),伽μ(0)<0・
>           <
Finally,suppose b≧ca/(1-ευ)・ Then it is casy to veriry that ι:スn(0)=acCOrding as,'υ=b(1-ευ)一Cc/{(1-
<          >
ευ)(b一Cc)}
Next,fl・Om(16),
>                <
1/44(1)≡O aCC°rdng as Tc(b―ca)冨 持          (18)
Similar tO the case ror ι「Иれ(0),the fonowing results are obtained.First wllen b≦cα,し:A“(1)<O When>           <
ca<b<者,c74,(1)<0.Finally when b≧ca/εc,C/A,(1)=according tt Tc={佐c―Ca)/{ε。(b一Ca)}
<          >
,wheFi∬7ピち1精ぅ糀 ,琵:舟)ピ∫
SpOnden∝s ttr Agen呼,P12bCゃ,ぃ ),研e ξven添畑 bW説
浦波稚,乳弄#f∫牡滸∴譜とユ〆tFピボ堀:だ壁15,P°ttЫe ca饂0     <
,,うcst(c,Tc,,・υ)=10,ll c=γ and Tc<{ca―εcb}/{εc(Ca―b)}
1     >
n廟修,比F)=仲♂ 証∞耐 ngおc軍1前? ='α一朝 Д屯 一叫
wilere γ={cα―(1-ευ)(b(1-1・υ)十rυcα}}/{εc(b(1-Tc)+ca rc)_(1-ευ){b(1-rυ)+Cc,・υ}},
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打絆稚,乳弄汗ff性議&譜髯.〆t:ピィ卍を溺,‖詈璃i渋群∝1           <
T9tbc,(c,Tc,Tυ)=10,ll accordingぉ=γ and'・v<{cα―(1-ευ)b)/{(1-εv)(免一b)}0           >
η臨 修,Ъ朔 =仲♂ 証∞?ngおc冨o and Ъ=や。-0-朝無 1-朝儀 ―叫
・when cc―(1-ευ)b<O and ca―εcb<0
There are nine possible cttes
神 眺 司 =( 呵ゞ
1中
い C:‥ け 棚 昨 叫
…
儀
―
脚 ―
印 鷺 i昂!|lυ)=O accordng as Tc>{Cα一 εcb}/{εc(Cc一り }and″υ >(ca―(1-ευ)b〕/{(1-ευ)(Ca一b)}
,μ'(Tc,Tυ)=pもll accordng tt c軍1,Tc=(Cc―εcb}/{εcttα―の)and rυ>{cc―(1-ευ)b〕/{(1-ευ)(Cα―b))
,Ebed,(c,Tc,Tυ)=l according as Tc<{ca一εcb}/{εc(Cα一 b)}and Tυ<{ca― (1-ευ)b)/{(1-ευ)(C.―b)}
1           <
,2beer(c,,｀c,,υヽ)=10,ll accordilig as c=γ and Tc>{Cc―εεb}/{ε(曳―b)}and Tυ<(cc―(1-ευ)b}/{(1-ευ)(C。一b)}0            >
PPP bedl停,Ъ朔 =叱 呵 韮∞? ng tt c:吼='α―朝
'cttα
―叫 孤JЪ<,α一〇 ―朝 煎 1-5X曳一叫
P・lbcal停,生∬〕=町 珂
“
∞耐 ngぉc百唯 <'α 棚 やcttα一叫 andち=儀 ―o_朝 /仲一朝 佳α一叫
m臨停,生F〕=pも珂 髄∞趙 ng tt c≡砒 生 >'α一朝 傲 け 明 and Ъ =,α―O一朝 /11-5X曳妍
77P besι(c,,・c,rυ)=10,ll accOrding as Tc=(cc―εcb)/{εc(Cαィb)}and rυ=(ca―(1-ευ)b}/{(1-ευ)(Cc―b)}
(3)EquiLb?a OFthe Game
NOtice tilat a Nash equilibrium oF the game cOnsists Of a combination Of mutually inclusive best resPonseS l)yI)Oth
OperatOr and Agenc). Vヽc especiany consider the equilibria Of rneaningfui cttes、vhere Age cy lias incentive to audit,
cc一b<0
活露鶏掃 下惚駐蓄郎:誤騨 簿監とⅢ:騨掛 浄留肥改選糀:弼乳批翠務茂
好喘;ど舟靴r:♯堺鞘盈μttε;釧蘭a計屋守檻腑 :電盈n沼陥♂耀跳 解駕二盤鷲言
“
;ifitと『を:せこ」財;∫l11411〕よ:どccb>0
拙
点
? 近
,野
とマⅢ堵 胆 I二島 ニゼ 納 亡;〕
狩 'Ц皓
~° 朝 A¢c+勇一り叫 ,冊,側)
{,,を
4,c豪
,,ど｀,P't)={{pυ/(Pυ+ρノ}),(1),{(cα一εcb}/{εc(Ca―b)}},10,ll}
(洋2)動c Ccnc wfrんο」ι derr‐■9Pο淀市とす
(1)BeSt Reply CorresPondence Of OperatOrヽ
Fl・Om(3),
め ま可 =烏
景子
=い 一 勇 一 先 》 押 ユ 句 (19)
Becausc t/。c(,T2)iS Iinear in,,and O≦,,と≦ 1,the sign OF t/。c(,2)Can be akssessed by studying t/Fc(0)and.υFc(1)NOw,
t/9c(0)=一Co<0
ι19c(1)=(1-ευ一εc)Pυ―C。<0
(20)
(21)
AIsO,
Kei Fukuyama・D ?[arc Kllgour・Keith W Hipel:Effectiveness of Self‐Reporting Systems
in Enforcement of Environmental Regulations
Assurnc here that l―ευ―εc>0.Consequcntly
卿 ):呻 中 期 :孟
(25)
(26)
ions of ιttn(0)and yスm(1〉The COrresponding best rcPIy
if C C tO,1)
if c=1
・l1/11ell的羽 帷 押 神 0=(幹
推 好
塩吉∬」)i学尻常生七L孔「ぱ[)=(ドII:三押
Whい 〕却 m味 仙 汁判 =(出 1:二♂刊
輌 向 抑 雌 翔 詢 =(榊
獲 好
¢(1)hr each castt the bestFtom(20)and(22),there are threc Posttble combillahon or tlle signs oF ι
`ο
c(0)alld ry。
denned as Follo、vs
1 0
reP,COrresPondence c n be,croc(,2)<O therettre cう
CW=,れ
旦
pll),and therebre cbCH=p:ュ
l accordng as
When Pυ>c。/(1-ευ―εc)
When Pυ=o。/(1-ευ―Cc),喝c('1)三O according as
'2C pll)
<       |,2<CO/{(1-ευ―εc),υ}
,1/1‐c(,2)=O according as ,,ゥ=cO/((1-ευ一εc)Pυ}l1/11cn″υ<CO/(1-ευ―Cc)
>       tT2>CO/{(1-ευ一εc)″υ}
{0) if,,<λl
allCl tllel・呻 件
(留 旅 姓
IVllel.e al釧障 拘 弓
On the otller halld,for Agency,flolれ(4),
(23)助 紐回 =緒 =虫15-先力C十(1-→b先
are stttdied beloTlr to set the)c For tllc best reply corresPondences,こ軌,れ(1)and ι/AIll(0)翫?Lrtt he m測拶
欺 r鞣旺}NoLbest reply cOrresPondences rc
C/4n(0)=(1-ευ)b一Cα
>               >
,Ve know tllat(1-ευ)>0,COnseq(lently t/4_(0)=O acCOrding as(1-ευ Ca/b.
<               <
AlsO,
yスЛ(1)=εcb―Cα
Consequently
>           >
1/4n(1)=OaCCOrding asεc=ca/b
<           <
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W隆岬 刊 卸 m提√ 中 TytbCerl→=(騨II:三甲
When(1-ευ)<Cc/b and εc<ca/b,,ιbe,(c)=(0)
By considering the stable conabinations Of the best rePIy corresPondences of Agency and Operator,Nash equi―
hbria can be Obtained Here we concentrate on our equilibriun■r seaFCh On n n―tra sitional ca.ses
I)When Pυ>ro/(1-ευ一εc)
謝導選|∃:財襲::雛搬封三雑寺咄}
瑠紹社三串三登舟剤監ヨ統解1寓三川1棚
II)When pυ<c。/(1-ευ一εむ)
酬脇社三嘲三蹴瑠駐:零4解1寓≡摂想i蛇月I13)When(1-ευ)=Cc/b and εc>ca/bi{fVt凛,C・)={p,λl),(0)),({λl),い,1〕),((λl,ll,(1)}
II-4)WI】en(1-ευ)=cc/b and εG<cc/bi{?ザ,C・}={(0),(0}}
II-5)When(1-ευ)くC。/b and εc>cc/b,{・・2技,C凛)={(0),(0〕}手{(1),(1)}H-6)When(1-ευ)=cc/b and εc>ca/b,{,ι球C*}={(0),(0)〕
By concentrating on analyses On tlle meaningflll cases of″υ<c。/(1-εψ―εc)tAgency htt sOme incent?e to
chOOse MonitOtt and(1-ευ)>C /b tOperator has sOme incendve to choose Complyl,we Can get the cquihb?a g?en
in Table 3.
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